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1 Introduction 
Key components of the knowledge-based economy are the creation, distribution, 
diffusion, use, integration and manipulation of information. Knowledge is the fun-
damental resource on which both competitive advantage and economic well-being 
are built.  
Knowledge has several distinguishing features as a resource. It has public good 
characteristics; it is protected by special institutions, such as intellectual property 
rights; it can be embodied in humans as skills, meaning that its trade and diffusion 
can depend on human movements. These features have led to a wide range of 
contributions in the microeconomic literatures on innovation, optimal protection of 
innovation, human capital, competitive advantage based on knowledge resources, 
and the geographic diffusion of innovation. The role of knowledge in overall 
economic growth, its contribution to differential development across sectors, and 
the resultant effects on employment and income often are the motivating 
macroeconomic concerns behind these more specific microeconomic studies.  
The papers contained in this special issue span the microeconomic topics, 
including the transfer of knowledge across organizations, the interaction between 
government policy and the production of knowledge, and the trade and diffusion 
of knowledge across geographic regions. Overall, they paint a picture of an 
economy with institutions and organizations that are porous to knowledge. How 
organizations incorporate this porousness is a key area of study in this volume. 
Cassiman et al. (2010) outline the wide array of techniques organizations use to 
access information from academic science, consistent with the “impact” policies in 
the UK that support a wide range of methods to achieve impact. Squicciarini 
(2010) suggests that particular characteristics of science parks and their tenants 
combine in a complementary way to spur innovation. Indeed, her work generates a 
set of specific design recommendations for parks. Clark and Sand (2010) find that 
research joint ventures may emerge endogenously only among similarly—and 
relatively—efficient firms. As these are also the larger firms in the industry, and as 
the ventures tend to be welfare improving, an implication is that policy restrictions 
on the market shares of firms in research joint ventures may not be optimal. 
Prokop et al. (2010) focus on the scope for policy intervention in fostering new 
knowledge, finding that both the distribution and level of skills in an industry 
interact with quality standards and intellectual property design to affect welfare. 
 www.economics-ejournal.org  2 
Marquez-Ramos and Martinez-Zarzoso (2010) find that threshold effects exist in 
the relation between exports and innovation as well as complementarity between 
exporter and importer innovation levels. This implies that policy to manage this 
relation should be applied differently in countries that find themselves at different 
levels of technological achievement.    
This introduction will summarize the contributions of the papers, putting them 
in the context of a—very selective—literature review. It will also conduct a brief 
assessment of the work and outline avenues of further research.   
2 Overview of the Papers 
A key feature of the knowledge-based economy is that it uses knowledge as the 
fundamental resource with which to build competitive advantage and economic 
welfare. Knowledge tends to have public good characteristics: it can flow 
relatively easily among agents once it has been created with little loss. Not 
surprisingly, then, organizations take advantage of this feature by making 
themselves porous to knowledge. This raises questions of how organizations 
exchange knowledge, how they manage knowledge flows to obtain maximum 
competitive advantage, and how society could promote these knowledge flows to 
enhance welfare.  
Knowledge can pass from one organization to another in a variety of ways, 
including via mergers (Ang and Wu, 2011; Jost and Van de Velden, 2006), sale or 
licensing (Anton and Yao, 2002; Buenstorf and Geissler, 2009), technology pools 
(Lerner and Tirole, 2004; Lerner et al., 2007), open source protocols (Lerner and 
Tirole, 2002), joint investment projects (Goyal et al., 2003), demonstrations (Gill, 
2008), inter-organizational spillovers (De Bondt, 1997) and research joint ventures 
(Amir et al., 2003; Suzumura, 1992; Roller et al., 2007). Three of the papers in this 
volume, Cassiman et al. (2010), Squicciarini (2010) and Clark and Sand (2010) 
study aspects of spillovers.  
 Spillovers: A Menu of Effects and a Diversity of Outcomes 2.1
A starting point of these papers is that spillovers need to be facilitated and 
managed to occur in the first place: both disclosure and learning may require 
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effort. This builds on Cohen and Levinthal (1989)’s concept that an organization is 
only able to take advantage of a knowledge spillover if it is capable of absorbing 
that knowledge. Absorption can require investment in some baseline knowledge 
by the receiver in order to benefit from any release of information by the 
transmitter.  
The conclusions one reaches about whether firms have an incentive to promote 
spillovers depend crucially on how one assumes they occur. A starting point is to 
model spillovers as exogenous so that a proportion of knowledge created by an 
organization simply leaks out automatically to others.1 As pointed out by De 
Bondt (1997), this often reduces the incentive for research effort in non-
cooperative settings since it generates a reduction in the benefits to R&D without 
an offsetting reduction in research cost. Also, in tournament settings, such leakage 
can reduce the difference between research winners and losers. Cooperative 
behavior can overcome these disincentives so that efficiencies can be achieved by 
pooling research efforts in the presence of large spillovers.  
As one example of this type of result, Poyago-Theotoky (1999) assumes that 
firms can decide to disclose useful, cost-reducing knowledge to (all) competitors 
after it has been created by research and development activity in a non-tournament 
setting: a firm may allow its scientists to participate in open conferences or publish 
their results. In such a framework, sharing knowledge never pays since it merely 
strengthens competitors. On the other hand moving to a cooperative industry 
structure, as one would with a formal research joint venture, may achieve 
economies of scale—of a type—through sharing research results since results of 
one project can move forward another project towards completion. Hence, 
research joint ventures should be observed jointly with (facilitated) spillovers.  
This result raises a puzzle, however, as disclosures do occur even in the 
absence of research joint ventures. It turns out that the level of commitment in the 
decisions affects the results considerably. Specifically, changing the order of the 
decisions to share information and conduct R&D affects the results and also 
broadens the interpretation we put on the spillover. When the decision to share 
occurs before the R&D decision, for example, we could interpret this as a case 
where spillovers are the result of the geographic proximity of firms. A two-way 
symmetric spillover effectively would be chosen at the time the firm locates 
_________________________ 
1 See d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and De Bondt (1997) for an excellent summary. 
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because the spillover would occur naturally through contact among employees of 
neighboring firms. In this interpretation, the spillover is only partially under the 
control of any single firm since it depends on the joint location decisions of the 
firm and its neighbor. An analogous case arises when firms choose a similar 
research trajectory—or design—to another firm: the fact that both firms have 
adopted similar research approaches means that research achievements by one may 
spill over to the other relatively easily. In this case, “distance” is technological 
rather than geographic.   
As pointed out by Gil-Molto et al. (2005), when the decision on the degree of 
spillovers precedes the R&D decision, and where spillovers are two-way, it can 
create free riding as firms attempt to minimize their R&D expenditures but at the 
same time profit from the research achievements of competitors. Kamien and Zang 
(2000) point out that cooperative research decisions should be associated with 
firms’ choosing similar research approaches so as to maximize spillovers; 
however, Wiethaus (2005) shows that free riding due to spillovers can be a 
positive feature even in a non-cooperative setting. Free riding can allow competing 
firms to escape from a prisoner’s dilemma where firms are doomed to over-invest 
in R&D in an attempt to gain competitive advantage. Firms may instead wish to 
make a commitment to similar research routes precisely to avoid such an outcome. 
Cooperative arrangements could also be associated with a choice of similar 
research routes, but would be associated with larger research incentives than the 
non-cooperative case.   
There can be other reasons to share technology that neither lead to cooperative 
arrangements, nor arise as a “solution” to a prisoner’s dilemma. Strategic 
disclosure—a pure “outgoing” spillover—is a case in point. For example, Gill 
(2008) finds that, in the setting of an R&D race, a leading firm may have an 
incentive to disclose its intermediate results in order to signal its commitment to 
the project. This can induce lagging rivals to exit. The incentive to disclose exists 
as long as the information that a competitor may have gleaned from the disclosure 
is not too useful to the competitor’s own progress in the race. Indeed, Gill (2008) 
shows that even if disclosure is not chosen, the option to disclose is nonetheless 
crucial to signaling and inducing exit in his model. If there were no option to 
disclose, then there would be no information value to the event “no disclosure”, 
and so there would be less deterrence possible. The type of disclosure that this 
model captures might be preannouncements of software, or prototype demonstra-
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tions at trade shows. A completely different reason for disclosure is modeled by 
Lichtman et al. (2000), who show that there is an incentive to disclose research 
results to affect prior art and hence the patentability of others’ competing inven-
tions.  
In Gill (2008), disclosure is an outgoing spillover, with no necessary 
“incoming” spillover. As such, it is quite distinct from geographic or technology 
trajectory spillovers, where outgoing and incoming spillovers are linked. While 
one might expect that firms would generally choose only to be receivers and not 
senders of spillovers, Millou (2009) points out that even if a firm has an option just 
to be a receiver of spillovers from others, it may choose endogenously to be a 
sender as well. This occurs when a firm’s outgoing spillovers induce sufficient 
reciprocal incoming spillovers to reward the firm for the disclosure. Indeed, this 
effect has been observed in a variety of spillover settings, including Harhoff et al. 
(2003), and Bessen and Maskin (2009). Millou (2009) echoes De Bondt (1997) in 
pointing out that product differentiation affects this balance, as it affects the 
“relevance” of the information to a firm’s competitive position. De Bondt (1997) 
and Bessen and Maskin (2009) add that the number of firms affects the balance as 
well, as this affects the “pool size” from which the firm draws knowledge 
compared to its own contribution to that pool.     
Hence, exactly what we assume about how spillovers occur is crucial to this 
literature.  Whether spillovers occur at all, their welfare effects, and their effects 
on innovation incentives and market structure are quite sensitive to the specifics of 
each model; however, the general effects of spillovers on incentives to undertake 
further innovation and incentives to form cooperative organizations such as 
research joint ventures are more universal. We have already mentioned free riding 
on the research of others. In addition, research is inherently complementary across 
firms in many of the models: firms have an incentive to share to reduce the 
consequences of decreasing returns to internal research. Direct cost sharing from 
collaborative structures or a reduction in duplicative research can also emerge. 
Finally, the benefits from spillovers are spread over a larger output for larger 
firms, meaning that more efficient firms have greater incentives to access 
spillovers. In sum, it is not the list of factors but rather their precise combination 
and weighting that generates the variety of conclusions about policy and the 
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benefits of the specific research joint venture or other cooperative designs found in 
this literature.2  
As an illustration of how these factors can be combined to answer new 
questions, in this volume Clark and Sand (2010) examine not so much whether 
research joint ventures form but rather who chooses this option when spillovers are 
present. Venture participants take full advantage of any technological 
advancement discovered by a partner, but undertake research investment decisions 
non-cooperatively. Spillovers are contained within the venture: there is zero 
spillover to the outside. In this sense, the venture is similar to choosing compatible 
research routes with little else that looks “joint”. In this framework, firms can—
and do—form coalitions that benefit them but disadvantage any outsider. In 
equilibrium, either all firms may join together to form a grand coalition or the 
more efficient firms may join together, excluding the less efficient firm. This 
results from several of the effects we listed above drive the results: a free riding 
effect due to the spillover, a more efficient joint research process due to 
individually decreasing returns to research, and the fact that the joint venture can 
potentially reduce the cost asymmetries among firms in the industry.  
As in the empirical study by Roller et al. (2007), Clark and Sand (2010) find 
that asymmetric firms are less likely to join together to form a joint venture. Their 
results also are consistent with Gugler and Siebert’s (2007) empirical observation 
that larger firms are more likely to participate in research joint ventures. On the 
other hand, Clark and Sand (2010) find that, while the insiders cut their research 
efforts somewhat and the outsider increases research, the total effect tends to drive 
industry costs apart when only the more efficient firms join in a venture. Contrary 
to the findings of Roller et al. (2007), this effect increases industry asymmetry 
when research joint ventures are present, raising industry profits but also those of 
the insiders. Indeed, consumers prefer the arrangement where the most efficient 
firms venture together to any other: free riding is moderate in this case, while 
efficiencies in research can reduce costs significantly.  
_________________________ 
2 See De Bondt (1997) for analysis and an exhortation for more robust results.   
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 University Linkages: Diversity and Management of Information 2.2
Transfer 
While theory can be developed to analyze many different observed joint venture 
arrangements, the theoretical literature’s diversity of conclusions depending on 
model specifics suggests that investigating empirically how and when these 
spillovers occur is very important to placing appropriate values on the literature’s 
contributions. Both Cassiman et al. (2010) and Squicciarini (2010) undertake such 
empirical analysis in this volume. Specifically, Cassiman et al. (2010) study 
university-industry linkages, emphasizing that there is no “one size fits all” way to 
establish this link. Squicciarini (2010) studies empirically the effectiveness of 
different designs of science research parks, a particular institution that facilitates 
linkages among universities and firms.3     
More precisely, Cassiman et al. (2010) dive into the “black box” of how 
spillovers are created by examining how linkages arise between academic science 
and the more applied science behind inventions. Recent policy debates, including 
the “impact agenda” in the United Kingdom,4 stress the importance of university-
industry transfer of knowledge as a measure of the externalities generated by 
academic work—and hence a criterion for receiving public funds.5 Similarly, Land 
Grant universities in the United States have traditionally placed value on 
developing practical innovations for the use—primarily—of farmers. Their land 
grant status is predicated on this transfer, again making public support rely directly 
on university-industry knowledge transfer.6 The Bayh-Dole Act in the US also had 
_________________________ 
3 For an excellent recent paper incorporating social network theory into an empirical model of 
spillovers, see Fershtman and Gandal (2011), which measures diversity within an empirical model 
based on social networks. The Cassiman et al. (2010) and Squicciarini papers concentrate on science 
spillovers to industry, rather than open source code collaborations, as does that paper.   
4 An impact exercise has been run as a pilot project as part of the 2014 Research Excellence 
Framework (REF). See http://www.ref.ac.uk/background/pilot/ for details. Based on the pilot, impact 
will be included in the 2014 REF assessments as input into the decision of how to allocate funding 
for public research. See http://www.ref.ac.uk/pubs/2011-01/. 
5 Impact will receive a ten percent weighting in the overall assessment of public research “quality”. 
See http://www.ref.ac.uk/pubs/2011-01/ for discussion and justification. 
6 For example, see the First Morrill Act (1862), which required the colleges to have a practical bent, 
and extended to agricultural innovation via a series of experiment stations in the Hatch Act of 1887. 
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as one of its aims better technology transfer from academia to industry 
(Vivekanandan, 2008). While the policy debate makes it clear that this is an 
important issue, and the externality argument for funding public research makes a 
compelling theoretical case for university-firm transfer, the way in which this 
transfer is to be achieved is less obvious and is largely left to individual 
institutions in policy guidance.7  
Linkages between universities and firms have been studied extensively.8 In 
terms of the effect of university involvement on the speed of invention, Mansfield 
(1991) shows that some innovations—about eight percent of product innovations 
and six percent of process innovations in his sample—appear to progress faster 
with academic input. On the other hand, Hall et al. (2003) show that academic 
involvement can postpone the generation of innovative outputs. In terms of how 
universities participate, Monjon and Waelbroek (2003) find in their study of 
French firms that it is primarily those that are catching up to the technology 
frontier that benefit from academic work. Many works, such as Parvan et al. 
(2007), Arundel and Geuna (2004) and Cohen et al. (2000) find that academic 
linkages are relatively unimportant in generating private innovation compared to 
other linkages, such as those to customers and suppliers. Further, direct linkages 
may pale compared to indirect linkages. In other words, the contribution of a 
particular academic innovation to industry may be small, but the indirect benefits 
of general collaboration between academics and industry via conferences and 
publications may contribute significantly to industry research.  
The reasons behind the benefits of indirect linkages may be that they codify 
knowledge and increase the efficiency of problem solving (Arrow, 1962), reduce 
wasteful experimentation (Fleming and Sorenson, 2004), help to identify and 
absorb external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Gambardella, 1992; 
Henderson and Cockburn, 1996; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006) and quicken the 
conversion of knowledge into innovation (Fabrizio, 2009; Cassiman et al., 2008). 
Knowledge of science may also encourage non-local search for improvement 
_________________________ 
The dissemination function was established in the Smith-Lever Act of 1914. For a summary, see 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=4980&page=9.  
7See the inclusive nature of transfer in the REF document, http://www.ref.ac.uk/pubs/2011-01/. 
8 In addition to the references given here, several excellent special issues have been prepared on 
university-industry linkages and related issues, including Management Science, 2002, 48(1) and the 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2003, 21(9).  
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technology. Scientifically active firms can, then, be expected to generate 
unexpected outcomes (Sobrero and Roberts, 2001; Cassiman and Valentini, 2009; 
Aghion et al., 2008). On another note, Stern (2004) suggests that scientifically 
active firms both attract employees at lower cost labor and simultaneously obtain a 
better bridge to the scientific world.  
Echoing this wide range of possible benefits, Cassiman et al. (2010) focus on 
the diversity of science-industry linkages rather than their value, frequency, or use. 
Largely relying on Community Innovation Survey 3, they classify Flemish firms 
into those that use cooperative R&D agreements with public R&D centers and 
universities, those that use publicly available scientific information, those that 
access citations to the scientific literature in their patents, and those that are 
involved in scientific publication directly. Although their sample size is small, 
they observe that many firms that are science linked use multiple forms of 
linkages. While some do specialize, there is no clearly preferred type of linkage. 
The authors conclude that the management lesson to be drawn from the study is 
that there is no “magic bullet” for firms to use to access scientific information 
overall, although they do find some evidence of specialization by industry.  
Cassiman et al. (2010) note the relative unimportance of direct linkages 
between industry and university patents, striking a cautionary note on interpreting 
academic-industry spillovers using patent citation data. This has been pointed out 
in other contexts by a variety of authors including Freeman and Van Reenen 
(2009) and a series of works by Zucker, Darby and others (for example, Zucker et 
al., 1998). Indeed, using university patent citation statistics as a reflection of 
university spillovers probably undercounts those spillovers very significantly. The 
relative unimportance of direct linkages found in Cassiman et al. (2010) and 
elsewhere lends support to the view that a main benefit of the Bayh-Dole Act in 
the US was to transfer earnings to universities from industry rather than to 
promote better university knowledge transfer.  
In contrast to focus of Cassiman et al. (2010) on diverse linkages, Squicciarini 
(2010) analyses only a single method of transferring knowledge and building 
innovation: science parks. Squicciarini (2010) postulates that science parks 
provide a seedbed for innovation by bringing together firms and academia in a 
small geographic area, supported by dedicated management and, often, financing. 
She focusses on patents as indicators of concrete and commercialisable innovative 
output, and diagnoses the features of parks that tend to facilitate or hinder the 
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generation of such innovative output. She finds that the presence of higher 
education institutions inside the parks, along with the presence of a large and 
highly innovative non-university entity affects the overall patenting activity of the 
tenants, although it is unclear whether the academic presence affects innovation 
via its role in influencing the type of tenant that chooses to populate the park or 
whether the academic contribution to innovative output is more direct. The role of 
a single highly innovative non-university entity is strongly positive on other 
tenants, while the role of higher education institutions somewhat negative, 
consistent with the ideas we mentioned above that academic participation in 
projects is associated with delayed patent output but that spillovers from other 
innovative private firms are a major source of knowledge for firms. Park size 
appears to have a mild positive agglomeration effect on innovative output. Overall, 
her work broadly supports science parks as an effective channel for generating 
academic-industry technology transfer but suggests that transfer from other types 
of organizations, such as large firms that are skilled at generating large amounts of 
patentable output, may have the most immediate benefit to smaller or younger 
innovators. Science parks potentially facilitate this transfer by grouping together 
such organizations. To the extent that an academic presence helps to attract the 
groups that will benefit from interaction, academic input is important to science 
parks even if it may not be direct.  
 Regulatory Design: Quality Standards and Skills 2.3
Governmental innovation policy can help to establish the conditions under which 
innovation can flourish. The three papers we have reviewed so far have had some 
innovation policy recommendations: an approach to research joint ventures that is 
flexible to participant size, promoting academic impact by a broad set of routes, 
and supporting the creation of research parks with joint university and “large firm” 
anchors. .  The centrality of knowledge to many sectors and public good nature of 
knowledge mean that the role for policy extends far beyond managing spillovers, 
however. It includes financing innovative firms, establishing regulatory frame-
works that stimulate demand and provide financial incentives for innovation, 
standards setting and procurement initiatives, education and labor mobility policy, 
intellectual property rights, sectoral policies, and trade policy.  
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Prokop et al. (2010) have policy design as a focus of their work. They analyze 
both standards setting and intellectual property rights design in a framework where 
these regulations interact with skill levels in industry to generate equilibrium 
industry configurations and welfare results.  
Minimum quality standards are pervasive in most developed economies, 
applying to industries from building to aerospace. For example, they form the 
main part of the work of agencies such as the National Institute for Standards and 
Technology (NIST) or the Food and Drug Administration in the United States and 
the British Standards Agency in Britain. These agencies tend to do more than just 
set standards, however. They often conduct training activities and disseminate 
information about best practice as well as produce useful and publicly available 
research that extends the technology frontier. For example, the Baldridge program 
at NIST specifically aims to improve firms’ technological and innovative perfor-
mance.  As such, these agencies contribute to the knowledge-based economy on a 
number of levels, including product design, innovation and knowledge diffusion, 
and development of skills. In addition, these institutions often generate new 
knowledge of their own.  
Many standards are imposed for safety reasons.9 Furthermore, it is intuitive 
that training, research, and standards activities fit together in a single agency’s 
mandate in the sense that setting standards requires an intimate knowledge of the 
underlying technologies. One can ask, however, outside of safety concerns and 
outside of agency economies of scope, how minimum quality standards and 
training could interact to increase welfare. Prokop et al. (2010) find that these 
activities do fit together from a welfare perspective in the sense that entry patterns, 
the timing of entry, and the end quality of products reaching the market depend on 
both the level and spread of innovative abilities of an industry. As a result, the 
welfare effect of minimum quality standards is intimately linked to industry 
innovative skill levels. More precisely, when innovative skill levels are symmetric 
across firms and relatively high, then a minimum quality standard can always be 
found that improves welfare, while for intermediate levels of skill this need not be 
the case. When skill levels differ, minimum quality standards can constrain the 
_________________________ 
9 Prokop et al. (2010) take the need for minimum quality standards as given; however, labelling and 
certification are alternatives to minimum quality standards, and can have a role where externalities 
from low quality are not significant. See Buehler and Schuett (2012) for a comparison.     
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date of entry of the low-skilled firm to a point where welfare can fall even if the 
standard increases the incentive of the highly skilled researcher to enter the market 
early with a new product. The interaction of the minimum quality standard, the 
resulting order of entry, and the spread of research abilities of the firms is, indeed, 
crucial to determining the welfare effect of the standards. An implication of this is 
that training and “best practice” diffusion activities and standards setting may 
optimally be linked when we consider their feedback effects on product 
introductions and profit.10    
This focus on the interaction between minimum quality standards and skills 
adds to existing rationales for quality standards. These include mitigation of 
information asymmetries (Leland, 1979; Shapiro, 1983), and having a “knock on” 
effect of raising all product qualities in a market as competitors attempt to “escape 
the competition” from lower quality goods (Ronnen, 1991).  
While minimum quality standards affect the first date of entry in an industry 
where quality improves over time, novelty requirements can potentially affect the 
time that elapses between subsequent product introductions. The private choice of 
these entry dates (or quality levels) may not be socially optimal because the firms 
do not collect all the surplus that their new products generate. Hence, policy tools 
may optimally require firms to postpone entry in order to develop the necessary 
improvements. More concretely, the Prokop et al. (2010) model incorporates both 
vertical and horizontal differentiation. In this context, we could consider two 
products that are protected by patents and currently manufactured and sold under 
different brand names. Taking this existing branding and design as exogenous 
horizontal differentiation, firms now contemplate introducing a new technological 
feature that will increase the quality of their offerings. The impact of a novelty 
requirement on the timing of introduction, order of introduction, and quality level 
is the focus of the study. The paper finds that symmetric high abilities combined 
with a novelty requirement raise welfare, with no necessary improvement for a 
middle range. The welfare effects are similarly ambiguous when innovative skill 
levels differ. Again, we see that the welfare effects of policy requirements are 
_________________________ 
10 The minimum quality standards literature often relies on a Mussa and Rosen (1978) model of 
quality choice. The results on how quality restrictions can affect the range of qualities available and 
hence the substitutability of products, profits, consumer surplus, and dynamic incentives to collude 
are sensitive to this assumption as well as to the choice of strategic variable (quality or price) and the 
cost of quality. See Napel and Oldehaver (2011) for a recent literature review of these issues.  
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intimately linked with both the level and distribution of skills in the industry: 
raising the skills of the entire industry symmetrically improves the welfare 
performance of the novelty requirement. To the extent that patent office—or other 
government department—training and diffusion activities actually improve the 
skills of firms as researchers; these activities are complementary in the Prokop et 
al. (2010) framework. 
Prokop et al. (2010) find that weaker patents, in the sense of weaker novelty 
requirements, can improve firms’ profitability.  This adds to a general literature on 
the private and public benefits of weaker patent protection. A combination of 
considerations has led to this conclusion in the literature, two of which we have 
already described above: (1 frictions may exist that substitute for patents to drive a 
wedge between diffusion of an innovation and elimination of profits via imitation, 
(2) research efforts of different inventors may be complementary so that there is a 
benefit to all firms or to society as a whole of having multiple innovators. The 
literature also points out that (3) there may be some benefit to coordination of the 
innovation adoption process (Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Glachant and Meniere, 
2010), and (4) hold-up problems may drive up the societal and private cost of 
commercializing any single innovative product that reads on a set of fragmented 
patent rights (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). An additional argument has been made 
that patents are not necessary to generate innovation since monetary reward is not 
the prime motivator for innovators; however, this is not really an objection to a 
system whereby obtaining a patent is voluntary: those who do not need the 
monetary reward need not apply (Lerner and Tirole, 2002). 
The intuition of the Prokop et al. (2010) result on weak patents does not rely 
on the factors mentioned above. Rather, the intuition is that the stronger novelty 
requirement, by dint of postponing the entry time of a second mover, reduces the 
“opportunity cost” of moving early. As a result, the leader is tempted to enter 
sooner with a lower quality product as part of pre-emptive behavior. In other 
words, by worsening the prospects of the second mover the novelty requirement 
intensifies the race to be first mover. This can potentially dissipate rents, with an 
associated reduction in welfare for some or all firms (especially low-skilled firms) 
in the industry. This intuition is related to the work of O’Donoghue et al. (1998), 
who examine optimal combinations of patent length and breadth protection in a 
quality ladder setting and Horowitz and Lai (1996), who examine the incentives to 
produce a “big” innovative step depending on the frequency of “creative 
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destruction”. The Prokop et al. (2010) framework is distinct, however: it considers 
a wider set of equilibria in a model with both horizontal and vertical differentiation 
and focuses on the effects on planned product introductions rather than on 
stochastic creative destruction. The focus of Prokop et al. (2010) also is distinct, 
concentrating on the interaction of skill levels of the innovators, including 
asymmetric skill levels, with regulatory design. 
In terms of how—rather than whether—skills, welfare and behavior relate to 
each other, a focus of the paper is on discontinuities. In the case of both the 
instruments studied, the fact that parameters are allowed to take a full range means 
that two types of equilibria with widely differing behavior exist in the model and 
are present for different parameter ranges. One type of equilibrium is characterized 
by pre-emptive behavior where firms race to be first entrant in the industry and so 
dissipate the profits of moving early; the other is characterized by firms’ moving at 
their optimal entry dates with no dissipation of profit. Indeed, in the first type of 
equilibrium profits equalize across early and later movers and in the second type, 
late movers earn higher profits. Moving from one parameter range of innovative 
skills to another can induce a discrete change in the type of equilibrium so that 
small changes in skill levels can influence not only the order and timing of entry 
but also the relative profitability of the firms and the entire nature of their strategic 
behavior. Hence, relatively small changes in the levels and spread of innovative 
skills can feed into large changes in both innovative and corporate strategy. This 
feeds back on the welfare implications of the two instruments, causing jumps in 
welfare benefits (or costs) of these instruments when skill levels change.     
 Regional Policy: Innovation and Trade 2.4
A final characteristic of innovation policy is that it often is formulated at the 
regional, national and also international levels. This reflects the importance of 
externalities, some of which are geographic. Not surprisingly, then, trade policy is 
one element of innovation policy. A variety of mechanisms link innovation and 
international trade, most of which pose empirical hurdles. Eaton and Kortum 
(2002) link technology, geography and trade in a modified Ricardian framework, 
reflecting the forces of comparative and absolute advantage as well as geographic 
barriers.  In this setting, trade transmits welfare effects of technological change but 
the effects depend on the starting conditions of the trading partners, so they are not 
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necessarily linear. A variety of authors develop the link from technological 
competitiveness to trade, while others emphasize that trade generates 
innovativeness through learning by doing and “escaping competition” effects, 
suggesting that the causation can run both ways. Product cycle models take a more 
dynamic view of innovation and imitation cycles, often with innovation occurring 
in “northern” countries and imitation occurring in the “south”. In these models, the 
role of innovation changes depending on the type of country involved, with 
innovation in some amounting to generating new technology and innovation in 
others amounting to absorbing new products generated by others.11  
Marquez-Ramos and Martinez-Zarzoso (2010) conduct an empirical study of 
the linkage from technological innovation to exports, attempting to surmount 
many of the empirical hurdles in this literature. Their measure of technological 
innovation, the Technology Achievement Index (TAI), was introduced by the 
United Nations Development Program in 2001. It is quite comprehensive, using 
indicators of a country’s achievements in four areas: creation of new technology, 
human skills, and diffusion of both old and new technology. These four areas 
attempt to capture both potential and achieved technology creation and absorption, 
allowing a very broad role for technology in both exporting and importing 
partners. This being said, the TAI is not unique in this area12 and has drawbacks as 
well as advantages, as do its alternatives. In particular, the TAI includes a measure 
of exports and is a simple rather than a calibrated average of its components.  In 
common with the techniques of other authors in this area, Marquez-Ramos and 
Martinez-Zarzoso (2010) attempt to exploit TAI’s good qualities while offsetting 
some of these disadvantages by their econometric strategy.      
The equations in the paper allow for a non-linear relation between technology 
and exports, and one is indeed supported in the results, although the nature of the 
relation changes depending on the nature of the trading partners, which is taken 
into account by a large number of controls. Consistent with earlier work on where 
most trade occurs, technological innovation by an exporter is positively related to 
exports, but the effect increases with the technological innovations of an importer. 
In this sense, technological achievements by exporters and importers are 
_________________________ 
11 See Keller (2004) for an excellent review of international technology diffusion. 
12 For a recent discussion of technology and human skills measurement, see Messinis and Ahmed 
(2010) and references therein. 
 www.economics-ejournal.org  16 
complementary in their effects on exports: they create conditions both for supply 
to be forthcoming and for that supply to find local demand.  
The paper also shows that the measure one uses for technological innovation 
affects the relation one observes between exports and trade. The diffusion of the 
Internet has a positive and mildly U-shaped effect on exports, with increases in 
Internet use from very low levels having a higher impact than increases from an 
already high level. In this case, technological innovation probably is working 
through the channel of decreasing “geographic distance” between trading partners 
by improving knowledge flows. Human skills also have a positive, but much 
larger, effect for exporters than for importers, and a pronounced inverted-U 
relation for exporters. This dimension is measured mainly by schooling and may 
suggest, following Smith (2002), that a key determinant of exports is the potential 
“set of ideas” from which exportable products are created, which may be 
attributable to the local skill set. Specifically, a minimum level of training may be 
necessary to generate products that others will find useful, but extremely high 
levels of education may be extraneous or even harmful to generating popular 
design. Hence, while technology and trade are related positively throughout, the 
shape of that relation in both exporters and importers is sensitive to the proxy 
used, reflecting the different roles that knowledge plays in trade.       
3 Assessment 
The papers in this volume lead to certain conclusions and follow-up questions. In 
terms of spillovers and technology transfer, one is struck by the heterogeneity in 
the methods with which transfer is achieved. Given that, in the words of Cassiman 
et al. (2010), one size does not fit all in terms of management of spillovers, nor 
does there appear to be a “most desirable” form of technology transfer from a 
welfare perspective, policies that encourage a wide variety of transfer methods 
seem appropriate. In this sense, the recent UK REF framework’s non-prescriptive 
approach to how impact is achieved is appropriate. The paper’s data set is quite 
small; however, suggesting further work would be needed for firmer conclusions. 
Cassiman et al. (2010) leave open the question of whether society could benefit 
from more firms’ accessing the science base. They note but do not answer why the 
percentage of firms accessing university knowledge is so small. Indeed, current 
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policy does not seem to either direct more public funds or otherwise distinguish 
between broad-based knowledge transfers from academia and focused but 
intensive transfer: transfer of large amounts of information to a few recipients or 
modest transfers to a large number of recipients seem to be treated more or less 
equally for policy and funding purposes.     
Cassiman et al. (2010) tantalizingly suggest that knowing how firms access 
university science could help us to establish the importance of geographic linkages 
and social networks in that transfer: firms that obtain access primarily by 
publications may not benefit from geographic proximity whereas those that share 
personal links may. Since the preferred form of linkage seems to vary 
systematically by industry, one could revisit the literature on the importance of 
geographically based spillovers: if a country or industry primarily generates 
spillovers via conferences or direct collaboration rather than publications, for 
example, then that country or industry may be more likely to exhibit highly 
geographically based spillovers. This might explain some of the inconsistencies 
that emerge in the literature on proximity and the use of public science.13  
Clark and Sand (2010) make clear that the welfare argument for promoting 
transfers depends on the precise conditions of the transfer, in line with the general 
spillover literature. This argues for caution in spending public moneys or 
instituting policies to promote blanket transfers. Clark and Sand (2010) also point 
out that since consumers and firms benefit from allowing the more efficient firms 
to form a joint venture, market share restrictions on joint venture formation do not 
necessarily improve welfare. Clearly, the specificity of the model suggests caution 
in applying this conclusion in a broad way to competition policy, but it would be 
interesting to attempt to generalize. Perhaps the main conclusion from the body of 
research on research joint ventures—and the Clark and Sand paper in particular—
is that policy frameworks other than “individual assessment” are difficult to 
fashion. The fact that these ventures often result in welfare gains, however, does 
support taking an open mind to their benefits, as is reflected in current policy.       
Prokop et al. (2010) suggest that innovative skill levels and their distribution 
interact with quality standards and patent design to affect corporate strategy and 
welfare. Their results have implications for agenda setting for such agencies, but 
also would need to be generalized before being applied in practice. In terms of 
_________________________ 
13 See Arundel and Geuna (2004) for a summary. 
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their implications for research into industry entry patterns, their models indicates 
that there should be no presumption that early entrants are higher skilled 
researchers nor should there be a presumption that earlier entrants have better 
products in any sense. Indeed, the paper is distinct from several of the recent 
papers that include entry, quality, and product differentiation choice. For example, 
while Mazzeo (2002) conducts an experiment examining which of several discrete 
quality levels a proprietor would choose in an entry decision, Prokop et al. (2010) 
focus on how the ability to provide quality and regulation affects this type of 
choice. While Prokop et al. (2010) shares with models such as Mazzeo’s the 
intuition of that entry occurs once a threshold profitability level is reached, it then 
determines the equilibrium product design choice in a specification that is flexible 
in its equilibrium concept and incorporates a role for regulation.  
That being said, Prokop et al. (2010) is a special case on other dimensions: 
more general industry configurations, innovation profiles and skill distributions 
should be investigated. The paper also leaves open the question of how and to 
what extent changing patent parameters in the context of broader industry 
regulation can affect welfare. In the specific case of minimum quality standards 
and novelty requirements studied in this paper, it is clear that only in cases where 
both first and second product introductions are too early could welfare ever be 
improved by using these instruments jointly; the paper does not, however, explore 
these parameter ranges or investigate the training implications of the joint use of 
these instruments. It also leaves open the question of how the analysis changes 
with multiple introductions.14 Carranza (2010) models multiple introductions with 
rational consumer expectations, but Carranza focuses on the interaction between 
competition and product introductions as opposed to regulation, skills, and product 
introductions. Clearly, more work remains to be done.   
Finally, the results of the Marquez-Ramos and Martinez-Zarzoso (2010) paper 
confirm others’ results (such as Estrada et al., 2006) that there are “threshold” 
effects at play in the relation between technological innovation and exports; 
further, it appears that technological innovation plays a large number of roles in 
the promotion of exports so that any analysis and policy is sensitive to the proxies 
it uses. Given this, the paper can be taken as supporting a broad-based approach 
_________________________ 
14 Interestingly, Mazzeo’s empirical work (Mazzeo 2002) indicates that lack of commitment to a 
product design choice does not seem critical to his empirical results.  
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towards promoting technological innovation—with many different aspects of 
technological achievement potentially receiving policy attention—but also one that 
may change its priorities as different stages of technological advance are reached 
and along different dimensions of technology. For example, there is little support 
in this paper for exporter benefits from an increase in already high diffusion of 
recent innovation (penetration levels of the Internet) or high levels of human 
capital (education) at home. In contrast, an exporter with an already high level of 
creating innovation from its human capital base (patenting) may do well to 
increase this dimension further. It would be interesting to study this in a general 
model where overall welfare effects can be studied: it is not clear that once these 
are specified fully this policy recommendation would stand. 
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